
By – Devank Maheshwari
In India, the captive generation regime is governed in detail by Rule 3 of the Electricity Rules, 2005. The Electricity (Amendment) Rules, 2026 (“2026 Amendment”) notified by the Ministry of Power (“MOP”) substitute Rule 3 in its entirety.
The 2026 Amendment keeps the two statutory pillars of captive status i.e., minimum 26% ownership and minimum 51% consumption, but revises how these tests work for group captive projects (especially those structured as associations of persons (“AoP”) and special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”). The key change is that the plant level captive qualification is judged collectively, while individual captive consumption is capped (unless an individual holds ≥26% ownership), with any excess treated as non-captive and exposed to cross-subsidy surcharge (“CSS”) and additional surcharge (“AS”).
The amendment also introduces a verification and appeals mechanism (state nodal agency for intra-State, and National Load Despatch Centre for inter-State).
Taken together, the 2026 Amendment is best understood as a shift from a disputes prone unitary qualifying ratio / strict proportionality approach that could jeopardize captive status for entire projects, toward a segmented compliance model with plant-level captive status.
Captive generation is anchored in Section 9 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (“Electricity Act”), which recognizes captive generation and links it to an open access right for carrying electricity from the captive plant to the destination of use. The surcharge framework relevant in practice is contained in Section 42, which is the statutory backdrop for why captive classification materially affects cost in so far as the surcharge is not applicable thereon.
The baseline text of Rule 3 (before the recent amendment of the electricity rules 2005) included a 26% ownership test and 51% annual consumption test, special handling for AoP and SPV with proportionality requirements.
The Supreme Court in Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Limited v. Gayatri Shakti Paper and Board Limited (Civil Appeal Nos. 8527–8529 of 2009) addressed a key ambiguity under Rule 3 by affirming that an SPV qualifies as an AOP. As a result, the requirement of proportional consumption was held to apply equally to SPV based structures.
The Court also introduced what came to be known as the unitary qualifying ratio (“UQR”), under which each captive user is required to consume, on an annual basis, at least 1.96% (with a permissible variation of ±10%) of the total electricity generated for every 1% equity held. In practical terms, this meant that each user had to individually meet a minimum consumption threshold aligned with its shareholding. Non-compliance by one user could lead to exclusion of its consumption from the aggregate calculation, potentially jeopardising the captive status of the entire project and exposing all users to cross subsidy surcharge (CSS) and additional surcharge (AS).
Captive users: These users benefit from clearer corporate group aggregation and more workable group captive compliance, but must implement stronger governance for ownership tracking, consumption accounting, and declarations required under verification procedures.
Project SPVs and developers: The explicit SPV-as-AoP treatment, plus the collective compliance approach, reduces disputes between the members of a captive structure.
NLDC: NLDC’s new role (inter-State verification) signals a move to operator backed verification, potentially integrating better with metering, scheduling, and grid settlement practices.
The earlier proportionality disputes created a high-stakes compliance environment where deviations by participants could threaten the entire captive characterization. The new rule’s “collective plant test + individual cap” should lower such risk for the project and redirect disputes into narrower questions: which portion of an individual user’s consumption is captive vs non-captive.
The new deeming fiction for group entities addresses a recurring gap that ownership and consumption within corporate groups often do not align cleanly with single-company definitions, and earlier rules relied on admissibility provisos that still left interpretive space. The 2026 Amendment has provided much needed clarity on group level compliance.
Moving verification more decisively into nodal agencies and NLDC, coupled with a standardized appeal route, signals the intent to make captive status determinations more standardized and less ad hoc.
Rule 3 lays down the conditions for a power plant to qualify as a captive generating plant. It is important because only captive plants are exempt from cross subsidy surcharge (CSS) and additional surcharge (AS), which significantly reduces power costs for industrial consumers.
The amendment clarifies group structures by including holding companies, subsidiaries and fellow subsidiaries as captive users. It shifts the focus to collective consumption instead of strict individual proportionality, introduces a cap on excess consumption, recognises use through energy storage, and creates a formal verification framework.
Captive users must collectively hold at least 26% ownership in the plant and must collectively consume at least 51% of the electricity generated in a financial year.
Earlier, each user had to strictly consume in proportion to its shareholding. Now, compliance is checked at a group level. Individual users can deviate, but their consumption counts towards the total. However, consumption beyond their proportionate share is treated as non-captive and attracts charges. Users with 26% or more ownership are exempt from this limit.
If the plant and users are in the same state, the state-designated nodal agency verifies captive status. If they are in different states, the National Load Despatch Centre (NLDC) carries out the verification.